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EVIDENCE: THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY

RULE-United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 946 (1981).
INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Williams,'
strictly limited the scope of the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings by announcing acceptance of the good faith exception. 2 The
exclusionary rule has its roots in the protection of rights guaranteed by
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. 3 The first
case to expound on these fourth amendment rights was Boyd v. United

States.' The more concrete origins of the exclusionary rule, however,
came from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Weeks v.
Unites States.5
The Weeks Court refused to sanction the federal government's use
of illegally obtained evidence at trial. 6 The Court stated: "The tendency
of those who execute the criminial laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures . . . should find no sanction in
the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the

support of the constitution." 7 Justice Day's majority opinion strongly
1. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 946 (1981).
2. The court's holding in Part II of the opinion was:
[W]e now hold that evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule
where it is discovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in good
faith and in a reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they are authorized.
Id. at 840. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of evidence seized in violation of a
defendant's fourth amendment rights. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914).
3. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For an in-depth commentary on the fourth amendment see,
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974).
4. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the federal government initiated proceedings
for the forfeiture of goods alleged to have been illegally imported. The Supreme Court
banned the compulsory production of the defendant's private books and papers
because such a production was the equivalent of compelled self-incrimination and
unreasonable search and seizure, violations of the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at
634-35.
5. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6. Id. at 398.
7. Id at 392. This rationale gave rise to a purpose of the exclusionary rule which
was later termed "the imperative of judicial integrity" in Elkins v. United States, 364
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implies the exclusionary remedy is part and parcel of fourth amend-

ment guarantees even though the amendment makes no such explicit

provisions.' Under Justice Day's interpretation, however, the exclu-

its agensionary provision applied only to be federal government and
9
states.
the
of
activities
to
it
apply
not
did
cies; the Court
In Wolf v. Colorado'" the Supreme Court enforced core fourth
amendment rights against the states through the Due Process Clause of
the fourteenth amendment." The states were not, however, required to

adopt the exclusionary rule." States were left free to determine ap-

propriate safeguards for fourth amendment rights. The Court soon
found itself confronted, however, with several cases of serious fourth
amendment violations by state officers.' 3 Under a theory of "increas-

U.S. 206 (1960). The use of judicial integrity as a significant purpose for the exclusionary rule has since diminished. See note 58 and accompanying text infra. For a
thorough analysis of the judicial integrity rationale, see, Comment, JudicialIntegrity
and JudicialReview: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the ExclusionaryRule,
20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129 (1973).
8. 232 U.S. 393-94, 398. Whether the exclusionary rule is of constitutional status
has been addressed by many authors. See, e.g., Cann and Egbert, The Exclusionary
Rule: Its Necessity in ConstitutionalDemocracy, 23 How. L.J. 299 (1980); Kamisar, Is
the Exclusionary Rule an Illogical or UnnaturalInterpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUD. 66 (1978); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L.
REv. 1027 (1974); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62
JUD. 214 (1978).
9. 232 U.S. at 398. This refusal to circumscribe the activities of state officials
began the operation of what was termed the "silver platter doctrine" in Lustig v.
United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949). In essence, the silver platter doctrine
legitimatized the use of illegally obtained evidence in federal courts, so long as the
evidence was illegally seized by state police only. The silver platter doctrine was finally
rejected by the Court in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
10. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
11. The Court termed the security of privacy against arbitrary instrusions by
police to be at the core of the fourth amendment, basic to a free society, and, therefore, implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Id. at 26 (citing, Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
12. The Wolf Court was impressed that even after the Weeks decision a majority
of states had not adopted the exclusionary rule. The Court thought it best to allow the
states to decide how to enforce the right against unreasonable search and seizure;
especially since the exclusionary rule was a matter of "judicial implication." 338 U.S.
at 28-29. The same day Wolf was decided, the Court approved the silver platter doctrine in Lustig v. United States, see note 9 supra.
13. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (in which the Court
reversed the District Court of Appeals and excluded evidence obtained by state officers
who had forced the defendant to have his stomach pumped); Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128 (1954) (in which the Court affirmed the lower court's decision to allow the
use of evidence obtained from repeated illegal entries of state officers into defendant's
home to install and relocate a secret microphone); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
(1957) (in which the Court affirmed a lower court's admission of evidence obtained
when state police took a blood sample from an unconscious person who had been involved in a fatal auto accident).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/8
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ing misery,""' the harsh results of these cases forced the Court to
reasses state application of the exclusionary rule.
The Supreme Court began this reassessment in Elkins v. United
States.'5 Though still not enforcing the exclusionary rule on the states,
6
the Court rejected the silver platter doctrine because it frustrated
states' efforts "to assure obediance to the Federal Constitution."'"
The Elkins court advanced two primary purposes for the exclusionary
rule: (1) to deter violations of constitutional guarantees by removing
the incentive to disregard them,'" and (2) to further "another con9
sideration - the imperative of judicial integrity."'
The next major case to reconcile disparities between State 20and
Federal application of the exclusionary rule was Mapp v. Ohio. In
Mapp, the Court overruled Wolf, holding the exclusionary rule applied
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2' A basis for the holding was the Court's view that the exclusionary rule was an essential part of both the fourth and fourteenth
amendments. 22 The Mapp Court relied on deterrence as the major
23
justification for the exclusionary rule, but also recongized the im2'
perative of judicial integrity in such proceedings.
The constitutional backing of the exclusionary rule was later with25
drawn by the Court in United States v. Calandra. In Calandra, the
Court held a grand jury witness may not refuse to answer questions on
the ground that the questions are based on evidence obtained from an
unlawful search and seizure. 26 The Court noted the exclusionary rule "is
14. See, Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 629; Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 1,7.
15. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
16. See note 9 supra.
17. 364 U.S. at 221-24.
18. Id. at 217.
19. Id. at 222. A later decision advanced a third purpose: "assuring the people all potential victims of unlawful government conduct - that the government would not
profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining
popular trust in government." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). This not a statement of the deterrent function because the
focus is on the effect of exclusion upon the public rather than the police. 1 W.
§1.1(f)
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

(1978).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 655.
Id.See note 8 supra.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 660.
414 U.S. 338 (1974).
Id. at 338, 342-55.
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a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." 2" The Court viewed the rule's
prime purpose as deterrence of future unlawful police conduct.2 8
The interest in the purposes of the exclusionary rule is more than
pedagogical concern. The courts' perception of the purposes of the
rule will determine its future scope and application. The Williams
court used the sole purpose of deterrence as established in Calandra
and subsequent cases29 for the basis of its decision. Consequently, the
Fifth Circuit has severely restricted the scope and application of the exclusionary rule.
FACTS AND DECISION
In 1977, Jo Ann Williams was indicated in the Northern District of
Georgia on two counts of possession of heroin with intent to distribute.3" Williams moved to suppress all evidence of the heroin. 3 ' She
contended her arrest was unlawful,3 2 therefore, evidence of the heroin
27. Id. at 348. If the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right, there is some
question whether it may be imposed on the states as a remedial rule. By categorizing
the rule as a judicially created remedial device, it may be argued that the states should
be free to substitute their own remedies. Ball, Good Faith and the FourthAmendment:
The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 635, 650-51 (1978).
28. 414 U.S. at 347.
29. E.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (in which the Court admitted evidence seized in a good faith arrest for violation of a law later declared unconstitutional); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (in which the Court admitted
evidence unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer in a federal civil proceeding); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (in which the Court admitted
evidence seized in a good faith border search under a statutory construction that was
subsequently held unconstitutional); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (in
which the Court admitted evidence obtained in good faith but without proper Miranda
warnings). These cases will be discussed in light of the Williams court's reliance on
them in the ANALYSIS section of this Note.
30. 622 F.2d at 833. Williams was indicted for violating the Controlled Substances
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). One count was based on the heroin found on Williams'
person and the other was on the heroin found in her luggage. 622 F.2d at 835.
31. 622 F.2d at 835.
32. Id. Williams based her argument that her arrest was invalid on 21 U.S.C. §
878(3), which describes the power of Drug Enforcement Agency personnel to make
warrantless arrests. 622 F.2d at 835.
The circumstances prompting Williams' arrest stemmed from her past conviction for
possession of heroin. In 1976, agent Markonni, the same DEA agent involved in the
present case, arrested Williams in Toledo, Ohio for possession of heroin. Williams was
convicted, but released on bond pending an appeal. She was to remain in Ohio as a
condition of the order releasing her. In 1977, Markonni, on assignment at the Atlanta
International Airport, recognized Williams as she departed a nonstop flight from Los
Angeles. Being aware of the court order restricting Williams to Ohio, Markonni conhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/8

1981]

NOTES

seized from her person during the search made incident to that arrest
should be suppressed.3 3
A magistrate heard the motion and concluded the arrest was
lawful, the search incident to the arrest was proper, the search warrant
was appropriately issued, and the luggage search was legal. 34 The
District Court rejected the magistrate's recommendations and sustained
Williams' motion, suppressing all evidence of heroin." The Fifth Cir36
cuit panel affirmed.
On rehearing en banc the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding in two
parts" that: (1) Williams' arrest was legal and the heroin found on her
person and in her luggage was lawfully seized,II and (2) evidence is not to
be suppressed under the exclusionary rule where it is discovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the
reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they are authorized.1 9
ANALYSIS

The decision of the Fifth Circuit in Williams was divided into two
parts. 0 The majority in Part I1 concluded Williams' arrest for violation of court-imposed travel restrictions was legal,"2 the search of her
person incident to that arrest was proper and the heroin found in her
firmed her identification, asked her if she had permission to travel outside Ohio (to
which Williams admitted she did not) and then arrested her for violating the travel
restriction of her release order from the Ohio court. A search of her person made incident to the arrest uncovered a packet of heroin in her coat pocket. Williams was arrested for violation of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. Markonni
then obtained a search warrant for Williams' luggage, in which he found a large quantity of heroin. 622 F.2d at 833-35.
33. 622 F.2d at 835. Williams also contended the search warrant for her luggage
was invalid because its issuance was based in critical part on the information about the
heroin found on her person. Accordingly, she argued, evidence of the heroin found in
her luggage should be suppressed. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979).
37. The court termed the two dispositions "alternate resolutions", each of which
had the support of a majority of the court. 622 F.2d at 833.
38. Id. at 839.
39. Id. at 840.
40. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
41. The opinion in Part I was written by Circuit Judge Politz and concurred in by
Chief Judge Coleman and Judges Godbold, Roney, Tjoflat, Rubin, Kravitch, Frank
M. Johnson, Jr., Garza, Henderson, Reavley, Hatchett, Anderson, Randall, Tate and
Thomas A. Clark, 622 F.2d at 833.
42. The court concluded willfull breach of a court order restricting travel,
entered as a condition of release pending appeal, constitutes criminal contempt under
18 U.S.C. § 401(3), and is an offense against the United States as that term is used in
21 U.S.C. § 878(3) (Controlled Substances Act). 622 F.2d at 839.
Published by eCommons, 1981
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coat pocket was lawfully seized."3 The Part I majority also found the
search warrant for Williams' luggage was validly issued and, therefore,
the heroin found was the product of a lawful search and seizure."
Having made the foregoing findings, the majority in Part I prudently
deemed it unnecessary to consider the applicability of the exclusionary
rule."5
The thirteen judge majority in Part 1146 of the decision took the
opposite tack, however, directing inquiries specifically to the applicability of the exclusionary rule. 7 The Part II majority held evidence is
not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule when it is discovered by
officers in the course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the
reasonable, though mistaken, belief they are authorized. 8
This dual holding is the initial deficiency in the court's disposition
of Williams. The only issue, as properly addressed in Part I, is whether
the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent could lawfully arrest
Williams. The court unanimously agreed the arrest was lawful. 9 The
Part II majority, though, continued its inquiry to decide the case even
if the arrest were not legal. This extra step created a hypothetical issue
which should not have been addressed under traditional theories of
judicial self-restraint.5 "
In its justification of the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule the Williams court noted the rule is not coextensive with the
43. The court concluded DEA agent Markonni was empowered to validly arrest
Williams pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 878(3). 622 F.2d at 839.
44. 622 F.2d at 839.
45. Id.
46. The opinion in Part II was written by Circuit Judges Gee and Vance and concurred in by Chief Judge Coleman and Judges Brown, Ainsworth, Charles Clark,
Roney, Tjoflat, Hill, Fay, Garza, Reavley and Sam D. Johnson. Id. at 840. Judges
Coleman, Roney, Tjoflat, Garza and Reavley also concurred in the Part I opinion. See
note 41 supra.
47. The court stated:
It is our view, however, that the drugs suppressed as evidence by the trial judge
and by our panel should not have been and that to suppress them was wrong,
whether or not Williams' violation of a bond condition was such a crime as warranted her arrest and the consequent search of her person that revealed their
presence.
Id. at 840.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 848 (Rubin, J., concurring).
50. This line of criticism was argued by Judge Rubin in his special concurrence at
622 F.2d 848. Judge Rubin argued that since the court agreed the arrest was lawful
there was no reason to consider whether the evidence would have been admissible had
the arrest been illegal. Id. Judge Hill, however, argued that Judge Rubin's reasoning
was backwards. Hill argued that if evidence is admissible without regard to the legality
of the arrest, the court should decline to reach and decide the latter. Id. at 847 (Hill,
J., concurring).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/8
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fourth amendment and not a requirement of the Constitution." Instead the exclusionary rule is a judge-made rule crafted to enforce conin light of
stitutional requirements.5 " This interpretation is reasonable
5 3
recent Supreme Court decisions limiting the rule.
The Williams court further adopted the position that the only purpose of the rule is its deterrence of future police misconduct; therefore,
the rule should not be applied where the deterrence value is not present. "IApplying this purpose to the facts in Williams, the court reasoned
there would be no effective deterrence of future police misconduct by
excluding the evidence obtained from agent Markonni's good-faith arrest." Therefore, the exclusionary rule was not applied. To further
support its analysis, the court compared the potential deterrent effect
of excluding fruits of good-faith arrests with the deterrent effect of exclusion in the differing circumstances present in recent Supreme Court
decisions in which the exclusionary rule was not applied.5 6 The court
51. Id. at 841.
52. Id.
53. The court relied on a series of recent Supreme Court decisions: Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (Court admitted evidence seized in good faith arrest for
violation of a law later declared unconstitutional); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S.
741 (1979) (Court admitted evidence obtained in violation of I.R.S. regulation prohibiting electronic surveillence); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (Court
admitted evidence from live witness testimony); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(Court held state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the
ground that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure was
introduced at his trial); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (Court admitted
evidence unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer in a federal civil proceeding); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (Court admitted evidence seized
in a good faith border search under a statutory construction that was subsequently
held unconstitutional); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (Court admitted
evidence obtained in good faith but without proper Miranda warnings); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (Court refused to extend the scope of the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings).
54. 622 F.2d at 841-42.
55. Id. at 842. The Williams court utilized the argument made by Judge Clark in
his dissent to the panel opinion. 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979). Judge Clark stated:
No proper deterrent effect is accomplised by the suppression of the evidence in
this case ....

Since the officer whose future actions are to be affected will not

realize his actions are wrongful when he is compelled to make a quick decision in
an apparently valid arrest situation which complicated legal analysis may later
establish to be invalid, we cannot expect him to be deterred.
Id. at 97.
56. The court compared exclusion in good faith arrests to exclusion in police actions that are attenuated in effect, United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); in
habeas corpus petition on fourth amendment grounds, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976); in grand jury deliberations, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); of
testimony to impeach a witness, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 622 F.2d at
842-43.
Published by eCommons, 1981
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concluded the good faith exception in Williams was similar to these
Supreme Court decisions and, hence, exclusion was not appropriate."
The Williams court's reliance on deterrence as the sole purpose of
the exclusionary rule, however, goes beyond these Supreme Court decisions. Deterrence is evolving as the primary justification for the exclusionary rule, but the imperative of judicial integrity is still considered
by the Court, 8 even if relegated to a mere footnote. 9
Empirical studies on the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule
reach no clear conclusions. 60 Yet the Williams court resolutely maintained that even if Williams' arrest was illegal, little, if any, deterrent
effect would result from exclusion of the evidence of heroin.' Even,
assuming, arguendo, Williams' arrest was illegal and the court excluded evidence of the heroin, clearly agent Markonni would reasonably be
deterred from making similar illegal arrests in the future. Moreover,
other police officers, after learning of the illegal arrest and subsequent
exclusion, would also reasonably be deterred from making those types
of illegal arrests. Exclusion in this instance, then, would reasonably
result in a deterrent effect and encourage police to keep aware of the
present state of the law.
The Williams court properly recognized two categories of good
faith violations. A "good faith mistake" exists where an officer makes
a judgmental error concerning the existence of facts sufficient to constitute probable cause. 2 A good faith "technical violation" exists
57. 622 F.2d at 843.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). "Decisions of this
Court applying the exclusionary rule to unconstitutionally seized evidence have referred to the 'imperative of judicial integrity' . . . although the Court has relied principally upon the deterrent purposes served by the exclusionary rule." Id. at 536 (citations
omitted).
59. See, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976).
60. "The literature produced in consequence is more remarkable for its volume
than its cogency." Allen, supra note 14, at 33. The problems encountered developing
an empirically valid study range from properly designing an empirical test of the deterrent effect to the proper interpretation of the findings. Geographical, cultural, and administrative inconsistencies also increase the difficulty of reaching a valid general conclusion. It is no wonder that judges have "explained their decisions by asserting the
deterrent effect of the (exclusionary) rule, and then have supported that effect by
recourse to polemic, rhetoric and intuition." Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 754-55 (1970). See also, Spiotto, Search
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J.
LEGAL STUDY 243 (1973); Critique, On the Limitationsof EmpiricalEvaluationsof the
Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra,69
Nw. L. REv. 740 (1974); Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven that it
Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUD. 398 (1979); Schlesinger, The ExclusionaryRule: Have
Proponents Proven that it is a Deterrent to Police?, 62 JUD. 404 (1979).
61. 622 F.2d at 842 (quoting 594 F.2d at 97-98 (Clark, J., dissenting)).
62. 622 F.2d at 841 (quoting Ball, supra note 27, at 638-39).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/8
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when an officer relies upon a statute which is later ruled unconstitutional, a warrant which is later invalidated, or a court precedent which is
later overruled. 63 The Williams court subtly, but significantly, expanded
the technical violation facet to include a law enforcement officer's
reasonable interpretation of a statute that is later construed differently. 6
To support this expanded definition of the technical violation facet
of the good faith exception, the Williams court relied primarily 6 on
6
Michigan v. DeFillippo1
and United States v. Peltier.6 1 In DeFillippo,
the United States Supreme Court admitted evidence seized in a good
faith arrest pursuant to a law later declared unconstitutional. The
DeFillippo Court noted that, under the circumstances, an officer
should not have been required to anticipate that a court would later
hold the ordinance unconstitutional. 68 The officer in DeFillippo relied
on a presently valid statute which was later declared unconstitutional
by the United States Supreme Court. In Williams the officer relied on
his interpretation of a presently valid statute which was not later
declared unconstitutional. DeFillippois a classic example of a technical
violation because of the subsequent invalidity of the original empowering statue. Williams does not meet the DeFillippo standard for
technical violations,6 9 nor, interestingly enough, does Williams meet
63. 622 F.2d at 841 (quoting Ball, supra note 27).
64. 622 F.2d at 843.
65. The court also used two Fifth Circuit cases, United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d
443 (5th Cir. 1976) (in which the court sustained the admission of evidence derived
from a good-faith arrest made pursuant to a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional); and United States v. Kilgen, 445 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1971) (in which the court
admitted evidence obtained from a good-faith arrest pursuant to a statute later
declared invalid).
66. 443 U.S. 31 (1979). DeFillippo was arrested for violation of an ordinance
allowing a police officer to stop and question an individual if he has reasonable cause
to believe the individual's behavior warrants further investigation. The ordinance further provided that it was unlawful for any person so stopped to refuse to identify
himself. In a search incident to the arrest, drugs were discovered on DeFillippo's person. Id. at 33-34.
67. 422 U.S. 531 (1975). Peltier was stopped in his automobile seventy miles from
the Mexican border by a roving border patrol pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The Act authorized warrantless searches within a reasonable
distance from any external boundary of the United States. Regulations were promulgated fixing the reasonable distance at within one hundred air miles of the United
States border. In the time between the initial search and the final determination of
Peltier, the Court invalidated the existing definition of reasonable distance in AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 422 U.S. at 532-33, 541-42.
68. 443 U.S. at 37-38.
69. The two Fifth Circuit cases relied on by the Williams court, Carden and
Kilgen, are also examples of the technical violation facet and involve the subsequent invalidity of the original empowering statute. See note 65 supra. For the same reasons as
with DeFillippo,these cases do not provide support for Williams to be classified in the
technical violation facet of the exclusionary rule.
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the subtly expanded definition for technical violations proposed by the
same court. 0
Crucial distinctions also exist between Williams and Peltier. In
Peltier, the Court admitted evidence seized in a warrantless, yet goodfaith, border search under a statutory constuction that was subsequently
held unconstitutional. At the time of their actions, the enforcement officials were acting in accordance with administrative regualtions which
had been judicially approved." In Williams, agent Markonni acted on
his own interpretation of a federal statute, not in accordance with administrative or federal court interpretations.
In both DeFillippo and Peltierthe initial arrests were legal under
existing law. In Williams, under the hypothetical posed by the Part II
majority, 2 the legality of the arrest was blithely overlooked. By refusing to apply the exclusionary rule "whether or not Williams' violation
of a bond condition was such a crime as warranted her arrest" ' , the
court implicitly sanctioned potentially illegal police conduct. This
distinction harkens back to the imperative of judicial integrity as a purpose of the exclusionary rule. In Peltierthe Supreme Court considered
the threat to judicial integrity, noting there would be no taint if the officer's conduct was in compliance with "then prevailing constitutional
norms.""' Thus, the legality of the initial arrest, which did not concern
the Part II majority in Williams, is an integral aspect of the good-faith
technical violation facet. The court's reliance on DeFillippoand Peltier
to bring Williams within the scope of the technical violation facet is
severely misplaced."
To support the good faith mistake facet of the exclusionary rule, 6
the Williams court relied primarily on United States v. Janis" and
70. See note 64 and accompanying text supra. The Williams court attempted to fit
the facts of Williams into the technical violation facet by expanding the definition to
include a reasonable interpretation of a statute that is later construed differently. The
statute in Williams was not, however, later construed differently. The arrest (and,
hence, agent Markonni's interpretation of the statute) was declared valid by the court.
See notes 38 and 44 and accompanying text supra.
71. 422 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added).
72. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
73. 622 F.2d at 840.
74. 422 U.S. at 536.
75. For a similar analysis of the distinctions between Williams, and DeFillippo
and Peltier see Note, EXCLUSIONARY RULE: GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION - THE FIFTH CIRcuIT's APPROACH IN UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS, 15 GEORGIA L. REv. 487, 499-500
(1981).
76. See note 62 and accompanying text supra (for the definition of the good faith
mistake facet of the exclusionary rule).
77. 428 U.S. 433 (1976). State police had seized wagering records and cash from
Janis. A state court invalidated the search warrant, suppressing the evidence. The

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/8
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Michigan v. Tucker."8 In Janis, the Court admitted evidence unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement Officer in a federal civil proceeding. The Court noted "in the complex and turbulent history of the
rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil
proceeding, federal or state.""" The Janis Court clearly addressed exclusion in civil proceedings only; thus, it provides no direct support for
exclusion in federal criminal proceedings.
In Tucker, the Court admitted testimony of a witness located as
the result of statements made by the accused during police interrogation administered in good faith, but without proper Mirandawarnings.
The Williams court focused on the relationship between good faith and
the deterrence rationale delineated in Tucker, but stated "where the
official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deter80
rence rationale loses much of its force." The Court's decision in Tucker
8
however, relied on several factors in addition to good faith. ' The
Court also relied on the voluntariness of the defendant's statement and
8
the reliability of the derivative evidence. Moreover, the decision in
3
Tucker possibly could have rested on retroactivity principles instead.
The decision in Williams, which relied solely on good faith, goes
beyond the exception delineated in Tucker.
To further support the good faith mistake facet of the exclusionary
"
rule the Williams court relied on United States v. Hill' and United
States v. Wolffs.' 5 In Hill the court admitted evidence obtained in a
search pursuant to an allegedly improper warrant. In its decision the
court found the searches "viable."'" Therefore, the police in Hill had
7
relied on a valid warrant from the beginning;" there was no good faith
reliance on a defective warrant. The Hill court's extremely brief consideration of the exclusionary rule was incidental to the main decision
I.R.S. assessed Janis for excise taxes on wagering and levied on the seized cash. Janis
filed a refund suit and moved to suppress the evidence. Id. at 434-38.
78. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). The police questioned Tucker after his arrest without
giving full Miranda warnings (Mirandahad not yet been decided). Tucker voluntarily
gave information which led police to a witness who later testified against Tucker.
Tucker moved to suppress the witness' statements on the ground that his identity was
obtained in the improper interrogation. (Tucker's trial occurred after Miranda was
decided) Id. at 435-38.
79. 428 U.S. at 447.
80. 622 F.2d at 845 (quoting 417 U.S. at 447).
81. See Ball, supra note 27, at 651-52.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 500 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1974).
85. 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979).
86. 500 F.2d at 316.
87. Id. at 322.
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and did not involve a significant reference to the good faith mistake
facet.
In Wolffs the court admitted evidence obtained through collaboration of federal and state agents in violation of the Posse Comitatus
Act.8 8 The court refused to apply the exclusionary rule because this
was an isolated violation. The Wolffs court was prepared to apply the
exclusionary rule if there were repeated violations of the Act.8 The
issue of good faith was not addressed by the Wolffs court. Neither the
Hill nor the Wolffs decision significantly considered the good faith
mistake facet of the exclusionary rule. The Williams court's reliance on
Hill and Wolffs, as well as United States v. Janis and Michigan v.
Tucker, does not provide adequate support for adoption of the good
faith mistake exception to the exclusionary rule.90
Aside from analytical deficiencies, the decision in Williams creates
practical difficulties as well. Most notably, the Williams decision provides no clear guidelines on how to apply the good faith exception. The
Williams court defined the good faith exception as "when an officer
acts in the good faith belief that his conduct is constitutional and
where he has a reasonable basis for that belief, the exclusionary rule
will not operate."" The court stressed the officer's good faith belief
must be grounded in objective reasonableness." To demonstrate the
function of objective reasonableness, though, the court used an oversimplified example93 which provides no standard guidelines for other
courts to follow. Exactly what constitutes objective reasonableness in
less clear-cut situations quickly becomes a subjective determination. 4
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1976). The Act states: Whoever, except in cases and under
circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully
uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute
the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both. Id.
89. 594 F.2d at 85.

90. This same conclusion was reached in Note,

EXCLUSIONARY RULE: GOOD

FAITH EXCEPTION - THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH IN UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS,

supra note 75, at 501.
91. 622 F.2d at 840 (quoting Ball, supra note 27, at 638-39).
92. 622 F.2d at 841 n.4a. In his dissent, Judge Rubin argues that to require the officers good faith belief to be grounded in objective reasonableness suggests uneasiness
with the reliability of a good faith test. Id. at 850 n.4.
93. Id. at 841 n.4a. The court used the example of how "a series of broadcast
break-ins and searches carried out by a constable-no matter how pure in heart-who
had never heard of the fourth amendment could never qualify." Id. The problem with
this example is that it provides no help toward determining objective reasonableness in
less obvious good faith situations.
94. One need only look at appropriate court decisions with dissenting opinions to
realize objective reasonableness will be subjectively determined by each judge. See,
e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/8
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Moreover, in implementing the good faith exception the Williams
court would speak to the exclusion issue without addressing the
ultimate issue of the legality of the police activity. 9" The police, then,
would never know if their activity was illegal, but would assume the

evidence was excluded only because the individual officer did not meet
the "good faith belief grounded in objective reasonableness" standard.96 The court's refusal to examine the constitutional issue could
virtually "stop dead in its tracks judicial development of Fourth
Amendment rights." 97
CONCLUSION

By viewing the facts in a hypothetical analysis the Williams court,
in Part II of the decision, surreptitiously established the good faith ex-

ception to the exclusionary rule in the Fifth Circuit."' So long as
evidence is obtained by reasonable, good faith actions, it does not matter

whether the evidence was obtained unconstitutionally. Most alarming
about this is that there seems little likelihood for continued judicial
review of fourth amendment guarantees in the Fifth Circuit."
The Williams court talked about the high price society has to pay
for the exclusionary rule.' 00 In one sense this is true, especially since
the rule "operates only after incriminating evidence has already been
obtained. As a result, it flaunts before us the costs we must pay for
Theis, "Good Faith" As a Defense to Suits for Police Deprivation of Individual
Rights, 50 MINN. L. REv. 991, 1005 (1974-75).
Professor Kaplan also states:
Nor would it suffice further to modify the rule and require that the police error be
reasonable as well as inadvertent. While such a standard would motivate a police
department to insure that its officers made only reasonable mistakes, it is hard to
determine what constitutes a reasonable mistake of law.
So long as lower court trial judges remain opposed on principle to the sanction
they are supposed to be enforcing, the addition of another especially subjective
factual determination will constitute almost an open invitation to nullification at
the trial court level.
Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1044-45.
95. See note 47 supra (for the language of the court in Part II). See also note 50
supra (for Judge Hill's view of refraining from reaching the constitutional issue).
. 96. This is contrary to Judge Hill's view that the good faith exception "encourages learning". 622 F.2d at 848 (Hill, J., concurring).
97. 422 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan noted that even opponents
of the exclusionary rule concede the rule's "usefulness in forcing judges to enlighten
our understanding of Fourth Amendment guarantees." Id. at 554-55. "The advantage
of the exclusionary rule -entirely apart from any direct deterrent effect - is that it provides an occasion for judicial review, and it gives credibility to the constituional
guarantees." Id. at 555 (quoting Oaks, supra note 60, at 756).
98. See note 2 supra (for the court's holding in Part II).
99. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
100. 622 F.2d at 847.
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fourth amendment guarantees.''I There is reason to believe, however,
that the "cost" of the exclusionary rule is much lower than commonly
assumed. 10
The Williams court's view that its decision affects only the exlcusionary rule 10 3 is narrow-minded. The good faith exception should be
judged by its effect on the standards defining citizen protection against
governmental intrusion. 04
1 "The admission of unconstitutionally seized
evidence is ...the linchpin of a functioning system of criminal law administration that produces incentives to violate the fourth
amendment."' 1 5 Until a better safeguard is designed and put into effective operation, the exclusionary rule is the only method by which to
honor the spirit of the Constitution.0 6
Anthony L. Geiger
101. Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1037.
102. See LAFAvE, supra note 19, at §1.2(a) n.9 (supplement 1981). For one study
cited by LaFave, in only 1.3% of 2,804 defendant cases was evidence excluded as a
result of a fourth amendment suppression motion. Id. Moreover, over half of the
defendants whose motions were granted in whole or in part were convicted
nonetheless. Id.
103. 622 F.2d at 847.
104. See Ball, supra note 27, at 655.
105. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 432.
106. See id. at 433.
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